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Abstract: Antecedenti storici dell’elezione presidenziale del 2020 – Starting from
former President Trump’s speech that propelled the storm of Capitol Hill on January 6th,
the article provides an historical account of the transition of powers between
administrations in the past decades and centuries. The analysis, on the one hand, highlights
the traditionally peaceful nature of such transitions, while, on the other, it points to the
instances when disputes concerning the electoral outcome occurred.
Keywords: Presidential elections, transition of powers, electoral disputes.

At a speech delivered midday on January 6, 2021, President Donald Trump
urged a crowd of thousands in Washington D.C. to go to the nearby Capitol to
demonstrate their support for his allegations of election fraud to members of
Congress scheduled to certify electoral-college vote results forwarded by the
fifty states and D.C. that day. Trump refused to concede victory to PresidentElect Joe Biden who had carried 306 votes of the electoral college to Trump’s
226 votes and won approximately 81.2 million popular votes to Trump’s 74.2
million. Trump’s continued refusal to accept the results of a presidential
election at this late date—two weeks before Biden’s inauguration as the 46th
President, is unprecedented in American politics. The energized crowd that
heard Trump’s speech “marched,” as he implored them, to the Capitol where
Congress was meeting. The mob used violence to overwhelm the Capitol police,
rampaged through the Capitol in search of members of Congress, and ransacked
parts of the building. Five human beings including a police officer lost their
lives; many more, including fifty police officers, were injured.
The last time the U.S. Capitol was attacked was more than two centuries
earlier by British expeditionary forces in the invasion of Washington DC in
August 1814, during the War of 1812. But unlike in 1814, the ubiquity of
smartphone cameras and the instantaneity of the internet ensured that millions
across the country and the globe eye-witnessed or could replay the vivid images
of the wanton sacking of the Capitol by an American mob and its symbolic
assault on the core of American democracy.
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This chapter analyzes the past U.S. history of peaceful transitions of
power and presidential election disputes. Among the key contributions of the
United States to the history of modern political orders is the peaceful transfer
of supreme political power by election. The United States did not invent this
critical feature of modern political democracy. But more than any other country
in the past three centuries, it has established peaceful transfer of presidential
power by election as a part of its enduring political tradition 1 and a shining
model for other nations around the world, seeking political stability and a better
future.
It was President George Washington’s voluntary decision not to seek a
third term in 1796 that set a path-dependent pattern of U.S. presidents limiting
themselves to two four-year terms. Engineering the first peaceful transfer of
power is one of Washington’s key contributions to the launch and success of the
American national political system. 2 There was no explicit requirement for
presidents not to seek reelection after two terms in the original written
Constitution; Washington pioneered a new constitutional norm. That
constitutional norm, so critical to the peaceful transfer of power in government,
persisted for a century and a half, broken only by the exigency of world war in
the 1940 election of Franklin Delano Roosevelt to a third term. In early 1951,
the 22nd Amendment to the Constitution was ratified, limiting future
Presidents to two elections and no more than ten total years in office.3 This
new constitutional rule codifying George Washington’s old norm has never
been broken. The oft-seen pattern in other countries of presidents or leaders
who amend or write new constitutions to maintain or extend supreme power
has not yet reared its head in the United States.
As important as Washington’s two-term norm to the establishment of
peaceful transfer of power in the United States and more relevant for present
purposes was early acceptance by the losing candidate of alleged legal defects
regarding states’ electoral votes in the presidential elections of 1796 and 1800.4
The unwritten constitution of the mother country, Great Britain, established the
constitutional monarchy—the leading prior recipe for peaceful transfer of power, i.e., neuter
the monarch by splitting the head-of-state and head-of-government functions.
2 In fact, it probably ranks right below his generalship that led to victory in the War of
Independence from Great Britain, his studied impartiality and aloofness, and his eye for
picking and supporting able subordinates in the first U.S. national government, as among
his greatest contributions to the early American republic.
3 “No person shall be elected to the office of the President more than twice, and no person
who has held the office of President, or acted as President, for more than two years of a
term to which some other person was elected President shall be elected to the office of the
President more than once.” U.S. Const. amend. xxii.
4 The following discussion of the U.S. presidential elections of 1796, 1800, and 1876, draws
from a Library of Congress website with primary sources and links relating to U.S.
presidential elections from 1789 to 1920: Presidential Elections: Resource Guides (Library
1
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The 1796 contest between John Adams, the Federalist Party candidate, and
Thomas Jefferson, leader of the new Democratic-Republican Party that opposed
the Federalist’s concentration of power in the national government, was close
and contested; the 1800 rematch between them was even closer and more
contested. Adams won the 1796 election in a crowded field with 71 out of 139
possible presidential electoral votes—one more vote than the majority of 70
votes needed to win. Four of those electoral votes, enough to have broken
Adams’ majority, came from Vermont. Article II, Section 1, applicable at the
time but since amended by the 12th Amendment, provided that Electors:
shall make a List of all the Persons voted for, and of the Number of Votes
for each; which List they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the Seat
of the Government of the United States, directed to the President of the Senate.
The President of the Senate shall, in the Presence of the Senate and House of
Representatives, open all the Certificates, and the Votes shall be counted.5
Before Congress had received Vermont’s transmittal, questions regarding
the validity of Vermont’s process for selecting its electors arose, such as whether
its legislature had set out the process in a current enactment rather than an
expired law or by nonbinding “resolve.” 6 Article II, Section of the U.S
Constitution also provided that “Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as
the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors.”7 If Vermont’s process
for choosing electors on December 7, 1796 did not constitute “direct[ion]” by
its Legislature, then presumably it was invalid.
John Adams was in an exceedingly awkward position because as the
current Vice President, he was the “President of the Senate”8 responsible for
opening the various states’ certificates of electoral votes. He would win the
Presidency by certifying Vermont’s electoral votes, despite the allegations of
procedural irregularities under Vermont law. And that is what Adams did,
perhaps with some hesitation. He was surely encouraged in that course of action
by a letter that Jefferson, the eventual loser, wrote to James Madison on January
16, 1797, between December 7, 1796, when the four Vermont electors had cast

of Congress, available at: https://www.loc.gov/rr/program/bib/elections/index.html).
Statistics from those and subsequent elections are drawn from “The American Presidency
Project” website curated by the University of California—Santa Barbara: Election Listing,
The
American
Presidency
Project
(available
at
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/statistics/elections).
5 U.S. Const. Art. II, §1, cl. 3.
6 See Bruce Ackerman & David Fontana, Thomas Jefferson Counts Himself into the Presidency,
90 Va. L. Rev. 551, 571-81 (2004).
7 U.S. Const. Art. II, §1, cl. 2.
8 “The Vice President of the United States shall be the President of the Senate, but shall
have no Vote, unless they be equally divided.” U.S. Const. Art. I, §3, cl. 4.
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their votes, and February 8, 1797, the date prescribed for Congress to count
them. Jefferson wrote:
I observe doubts are still expressed as to the validity of the Vermont
election. Surely in so great a case, substance & not form should prevail. I cannot
suppose that the Vermont constitution has been strict in requiring particular
forms of expressing the legislative will. As far as my disclaimer may have any
effect, I pray you to declare it on every occasion foreseen or not foreseen by me,
in favor of the choice of the people substantially expressed, and to prevent the
phaenomenon of a Pseudo-president at so early a day.9
The precedent of Jefferson’s acquiescence in the 1796 election is especially
relevant to the November 2020 election because certain key allegations of fraud
in the 2020 election involved the same Article II, Section 1 claim, to wit, that
certain State electors (e.g., in Pennsylvania) had not been selected “in such
Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct.”
In the 1800 rematch election, Jefferson ultimately won the electoral
college vote by 73 votes to Adams’ 65 votes, out of 138 available votes. Four of
Jefferson’s votes were delivered by electors in Georgia. Georgia’s transmittal,
however, exhibited a technical defect. It did not present a “List of all the Persons
voted for, and of the Number of Votes for each” as Article II, Section 2 explicitly
required. Instead, Georgia’s letter had the names of the Democratic-Republican
Party’s presidential candidate Thomas Jefferson and its vice-presidential
candidate Aaron Burr, side by side. 10 The names of the four electors were
written below Jefferson’s and Burr’s names, and the electors did not “sign and
certify” this ballot. This time, when the State’s transmittals were opened and
counted by Congress, it was Jefferson as Vice President and therefore the
President of the Senate. He did not hesitate to proceed with counting Georgia’s
vote; nor did Adams and his Federalist Party object, although there was some
rumbling about the irregularity in the contemporaneous press.
There are two conclusions to be drawn from the 1796 and 1800 elections
in which key American founders—John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, and James
Madison and other members of early Congresses—were key participants.
These conclusions are especially important for U.S. jurists who privilege
original meanings of constitutional provisions. First, it does not appear that the
President of the Senate who opened the state’s electoral vote transmittals and
the Congress that counted them were understood to have a substantive review
9To

James Madison from Thomas Jefferson, 16 January 1797,” Founders Online, National
Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-16-02-0329. [Original
source: The Papers of James Madison, vol. 16, 27 April 1795 – 27 March 1797, ed. J. C. A. Stagg,
Thomas A. Mason, and Jeanne K. Sisson. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1989,
461.]
10 Ackerman & Fontana, supra note 5, at 591.
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role with respect to state electoral votes. Congress’s role appears to have been
viewed as an accounting function. That perception is confirmed by the usage of
the word “tellers” in the first and present electoral count statutes11 to refer to
two designated members of the two chambers of Congress designated to help
the President of the Senate count votes. The states, then, were the ultimate
arbiters of designing their rules for presidential electors and determining
whether their rules for selecting electors had been followed. Today, all the
states and the District of Columbia have legislative enactments directing
presidential electors to cast their votes to conform to the winner of the popular
vote in the state.12 For the 1796 and 1800 elections, the state legislatures chose
presidential electors.
Moreover, the electors whom state legislatures were to choose were not
supposed to be stand-ins for the popular vote as an original matter, as they are
today. Rather, as Alexander Hamilton described in Federalist 68, they were to
be respected men selected by their state legislatures for their judgment.13 The
electors were to convene in their respective states to deliberate and select a
president, like several colleges of cardinals electing the pope. In this sense, there
is no single electoral college but several electoral colleges corresponding to the
number of states. The electors could not hold current federal office, to prevent
bias in favor of an incumbent president who gave them the office.14 Also, to
prevent bribery, the electors in each state were called together on a temporary
basis, not a standing body. In such a system, it was naturally paramount that
the will of the state legislatures prevail in the selection of electors. But that is
no longer the case when the electors are ceremonial and directed to cast their
votes to correspond to each state’s popular vote.
Second, the Vice President, as President of the Senate, is the key national
government figure in the certification process, with the explicit constitutional
duty of opening state transmittals of electoral votes. But the role is fraught with
conflict of interest, as we saw in the cases of both Adams in 1796 and Jefferson
3.U.S.C. § 15.
Maine and Nebraska have state laws providing for electors to vote according to the
winner of the popular vote in their respective U.S. congressional districts.
13 The Federalist 68 (Hamilton). Hamilton wrote:
that the immediate election should be made by men most capable of analyzing the qualities
adapted to the station, and acting under circumstances favorable to deliberation, and to a
judicious combination of all the reasons and inducements which were proper to govern their
choice. A small number of persons, selected by their fellow-citizens from the general mass,
will be most likely to possess the information and discernment requisite to such complicated
investigations.
14 “[N]o Senator or Representative, or Person holding an Office of Trust or Profit under
the United States, shall be appointed an Elector.” U.S. Const. Art. II. See Federalist 68
(“And they have excluded from eligibility to this trust, all those who from situation might
be suspected of too great devotion to the President in office.”).
11
12
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in 1800.15 Who would prevail if there were a difference of opinion between the
Vice President and Congress about whether or how a state’s electoral votes
should be counted, even if it is no more than an accounting? What if a majority
of the House of Representatives and of the Senate believe that a state’s
transmittal of electoral votes should be certified, but the Vice President
disagrees? And, furthermore, what if there is a difference of opinion on
certification between the House and the Senate?
The words of the Constitution give no clear answers to these questions.
In the event of a tie of electoral votes, Article II does specify that the House of
Representatives shall choose the President, but with each State’s delegation
assigned one vote.16 This constitutional settlement for ties suggests that the
House’s preference may take precedence over the Senate’s with respect to any
tiebreakers regarding how to “count” presidential electoral votes. But the words
of the Constitution offer no clue with respect to who should prevail in
disagreements between Congress and the Vice President about whether to
count certain state electoral votes—a fissure the 1796 and 1800 elections did
not feature. Of course, more generally speaking, the 1796 and 1800 elections
did not involve allegations of widespread fraud in the state processes for
choosing electors, particularly since, as noted above, those processes involved
state legislatures, not more numerous popular votes that could be subject to
more diffuse fraud. The 12th Amendment (ratified in 1804) separated electoral
votes for the President and Vice President to fix the impasse in the 1800 election
when Jefferson and Burr received the same number of votes and the House had
to decide between them, but it did not address these questions about potential
disagreement within Congress about certifying state electoral votes.17 A subconstitutional enactment – the Electoral Count Act of 1887 did address them,
in the aftermath of the 1876 presidential election to be discussed shortly.
Returning to the larger theme of the United States’ strong historical
record of peaceful transitions, Jefferson and both of his Virginia DemocraticRepublican Party successors—James Madison and James Monroe—adhered to
Washington’s norm of a two-term Presidency. Their nineteenth-century
successors also continued the important peaceful transfer of power tradition.
The greatest possibility of breaking it arose in the run-up to the 1876 Election,
which remains the most contentious U.S. presidential election ever, although
Both Adams and Jefferson encountered situations in which disregarding technical defects
operated in their favor. But vice presidents have also refrained from challenging electoral
vote certifications in recent close presidential elections despite a strong personal interest
in doing so, including Vice President Richard Nixon in 1960 when he lost to John F.
Kennedy, Vice President Albert Gore when he lost to George W. Bush in 2000, or Vice
President Joe Biden when Hilary Clinton lost to Donald Trump in 2016.
16 U.S. Const. Art. I, §2; amend. xii.
17 U.S. Const. amend. xii.
15
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even then the U.S. Capitol was not physically attacked.18 Ulysses S. Grant, the
18th President, had already served two terms but was contemplating running
for a third term. He ultimately decided against it after the House of
Representatives passed a resolution by a 233-18 vote declaring the two-term
constitutional norm a safeguard against dictatorship, even if it were not codified
in the Constitution.
Rutherford B. Hayes for the Republican Party and Samuel J. Tilden for
the Democratic Party faced off in the 1876 Presidential Election, which, with
Grant out of it and the Republicans facing a backlash because of corruption in
his administration, promised to be hotly contested. Hayes, the Governor of
Ohio, had been a compromise choice for the Republicans, while Tilden, the
Governor of New York, was a commanding front-runner at the Democratic
nominating convention. The Democrats had strong expectations of securing
the Presidency for the first time since James Buchanan’s election in 1856—
perhaps only twenty years prior, but an altogether different, era, society, and
country. The greatest national socio-political issue at the time was the
continuation of the Republican-led Reconstruction in the South.
The high drama of the election came down to 20 contested electoral votes:
Florida’s 4 votes, Louisiana’s 8, South Carolina’s 7, and 1 contested vote out of
Oregon’s 3. Tilden had captured 184 votes to Hayes’ 165, but the 20 votes in
controversy would give Hayes 185 votes and the Presidency.19 There were still
small numbers of federal troops in South Carolina and Louisiana, and U.S.recognized officials in those states and Florida certified electoral votes in favor
of Hayes. The Democrats picked different electors, asserting that they had won
the popular vote in the three states. This was in fact true but only because of
rampant election fraud and violence against and suppression of Black voters
despite the newly ratified (1870) 15th Amendment guaranteeing them the right
to vote. It is likely that the majority-Black states of Louisiana and South
President Grant, the former commanding general of the Union armies in the American
Civil War, had pre-deployed troops to the national capital, a precaution that likely deterred
any mob violence.
19 Tilden also won 50.9% of the popular vote versus Hayes’ 47.9%, although systemic
suppression of Black voters in southern states indubitably inflated Tilden’s margin of
victory. The 1876 election is the subject of many books. The leading legal account is in
Charles Fairman’s Supplement to Volume VII of the Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise
History of the Supreme Court of the United States, entitled Five Justices and the Electoral
Commission of 1877 (1988). There are many other prominent accounts, including: Charles
Calhoun, Conceiving a New Republic: The Republican Party and the Southern Question, 18691900 (2006); Michael F. Holt, By One Vote: The Disputed Election of 1876 (2017); Roy Morris,
Jr., Fraud of the Century: Rutherford B. Hayes, Samuel Tilden, and the Stolen Election of 1876
(2007); William H. Rehnquist, Centennial Crisis: The Disputed Election of 1876 (2007); C.
Vann Woodward, Reunion and Reaction: The Compromise of 1877 (1991 edition) (1966); Paul
L. Haworth, The Hayes-Tilden Disputed Presidential Election of 1876 (1907).
18
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Carolina would have gone for Hayes without Black voter intimidation, although
majority-White Florida might have gone to Tilden. Voters in Oregon had
voted overwhelmingly for Hayes, but the state’s Democratic governor asserted
that one of the Republican electors was disqualified by holding a federal office20
and substituted an elector who voted for Tilden.
Such was the state of play when Congress took up the challenge of
certifying the electoral vote, which was scheduled to happen on March 4, 1877.
The Democrats controlled the House of Representatives, and the Republicans
controlled the Senate. Because of the death of Vice President Henry Wilson in
1875, Republican Senator Thomas W. Ferry, who had been chosen as President
pro tempore of the Senate took his role as President of the Senate in the opening
and counting of the electoral votes. In counting the votes, the Democrats
insisted on a practice that had prevailed since 1865 of not counting state votes
that were objected to unless both Houses concurred in dismissing the
objection. 21 The Republicans, who had originated the 1865 rule but
conveniently abandoned it in 1875 in the run-up to the 1876 election, asserted
that the President of the Senate had the deciding power. The country was
apparently as divided as Congress. New York Congressman Abram S. Hewitt,
who was Chairman of the Democratic National Committee at the time, asserted
that he “knew of fifteen states in which Democratic forces composed largely of
war veterans were organized and prepared to move on Washington to compel
the inauguration of Tilden.”22
The deadlocked Congress passed a statute on January 29, 1877,
establishing a 15-member commission to decide which electoral votes ought to
be counted. 23 The Commission consisted of 5 members from the House—3
Democrats (majority) and 2 Republicans; 5 members from the Senate—3
Republicans (majority) and 2 Democrats; and five Justices of Supreme Court –
2 Democrats and 2 Republicans, who chose the fifth – Joseph Bradley, a
Republican. The Commission voted along party lines and awarded the 20
electoral votes to Hayes. While the Commission deliberated, Democratic and
Republican leaders behind the scenes negotiated the so-called Compromise of
1877 whereby the Democrats agreed to accept Hayes’ presidency, so long as it
Article II, Section 1 provides that “no Senator of Representative or Person holding an
Office of Trust or Profit under the United States shall be appointed an Elector.” The
Democratic Governor alleged that one of the Republican electors had been a postmaster at
the time of appointment.
21 38th Congress, 22nd Joint Rule (Feb. 6, 1865), available at A Century of Lawmaking for
a New Nation: U.S. Congressional Documents and Debates, 1774 – 1875:
https://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage. See also Kinvin L. Wroth, Election Contests and the
Electoral Vote, 65 Dickinson L. Rev. 321 (1961).
22 Woodward, Reunion and Reaction, at 7.
23 See Fairman, at 53.
20
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withdrew federal troops from the last two occupied states of Louisiana and
South Carolina and provided grants and subsidies for railroad construction and
other improvements in the South.
It was the barely averted constitutional crisis of the 1876 Election, and
tendentious elections in 1880 and 1884, that led Congress to enact the Electoral
Count Act of 1887.24 The basic aim of the Act was to resolve any future scenario
like the 1876 Election where a state presented two slates of electoral votes and
Congress was unable to resolve the controversy. It did this by creating a “safe
harbor”: if state officials comply with the statute’s guidelines for setting out a
process to resolve election disputes and resolve any such disputes under that
process “at least six days before the time fixed for the meeting of the electors,”,
then the state’s transmittal of a slate of electoral votes is entitled to a
presumption of validity by Congress. 25 Article II, Section 1 provides that
“Congress may determine the Time of chusing the Electors, and the Day on
which they shall give their Votes; which Day shall be the same throughout the
United States.” However, this constitutional provision does not explicitly say
whether a state’s electoral votes are “entitled to a presumption of validity” as
the statue does. And under the statute’s terms, Congress’s discretion to review
state electoral votes is limited to situations in which a state does not comply
with the safe harbor guidelines, a governor certifies two or more slates of
electors, electors are ineligible under the Constitution, there is a ministerial
error, or the electoral votes were not “regularly given.”
The Electoral Count Act, as presently enacted, further circumscribes the
role of the Vice President and of Congress in certifying the states’ presidential
electoral votes. The House and the Senate are to meet in a joint session,
presided over by the Vice President as President of the Senate. The statute
designates two “tellers” for each chamber to read out state certifications
(proceeding alphabetically) opened by the Vice President who asks for any
objections. An objection must be submitted jointly by a member of the House
and the Senate in written form, whereupon the two chambers withdraw
separately to debate the merits of the objection for no more than two hours.26
If there is only one slate of electoral votes transmitted by a state, then they are
counted unless both the House and the Senate find that the votes were not
“regularly given” by “lawfully certified” electors.
In summary, the Electoral Count Act diminishes the role that Congress
and the Vice President play in the certification of electoral votes. The states are
Pub.
L.
49-90,
24
Stat.
373,
available
at:
https://govtrackus.s3.amazonaws.com/legislink/pdf/stat/24/STATUTE-24-Pg373.pdf.
Codified at 3 U.S.C. §1 et seq.
25 3 U.S.C. § 5.
26 3 U.S.C. § 15.
24
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plainly the primary actors in the process of certifying their electoral votes for
the President. The Act sets forth a scheme for deciding when a state presents
more than one slate of electors, as was the case in 1876. But in cases where
there a state only presents one slate of electors, it creates a safe harbor that the
state may invoke to minimize congressional scrutiny and that also curtails the
scope of review by Congress and the Vice President. Some have asserted that
the statute goes too far in restricting the role of Congress and the Vice President
in the presidential electoral certification process, contrary to Article II as
amended by the Twelfth Amendment. Certainly the 1865 Congressional joint
rule requiring that both Houses must assent to certification if an objection to a
state’s slate of electors is made, which the Republicans had originated but
abandoned ten years later, suggests a more robust role for Congress in
certifying the states’ rules. The Electoral Count Act’s new rule on objections
requiring a Representative and a Senator both to join an objection, followed by
deliberation by each Chamber, dramatically curtails federal governmental
power over state electoral vote certification. But the Electoral Count Act has
never been successfully challenged in federal court, nor is it likely to be viewed
as justiciable by the courts if it were.
This historical context helps us to understand the legal bases for, and to
assess the validity of, the challenges to Congressional certification of the state’s
electoral votes on January 6, 2021, made by certain Republican members of
Congress led by Senators Rafael Edward (“Ted”) Cruz of Texas and Joshua
David (“Josh”) Hawley of Missouri.27 Ten other Republican Senators and more
than a hundred Republican Members of the House of Representatives signaled
support for Cruz’s and Hawley’s proposal before the January 6 certification vote.
Cruz and Hawley asserted two grounds for their challenges. First, despite
the dismissals of election-fraud lawsuits in state and federal courts across the
nation, Cruz and Hawley claimed that the widespread belief among American
voters who had supported President Trump that there were election
irregularities warranted the establishment of an electoral commission to
investigate. There was, of course, a precedent for such a commission in the
Electoral Commission of 1877. The Republican Senators requested that the
commission be given “full investigatory and fact-finding authority, to conduct
an emergency 10-day audit of the election returns in the disputed states. Once
completed, individual states would evaluate the Commission's findings and
could convene a special legislative session to certify a change in their vote, if
needed.”

Joint Statement from Senators Cruz, Johnson, Lankford, Daines, Kennedy, Blackburn,
Braun, Senators-Elect Lummis, Marshall, Hagerty, Tuberville, Ted Cruz, U.S. Senator for
Texas, available at: https://www.cruz.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=5541.
27
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Second, they alleged that the counting of popular votes—and hence the
assignment of electoral votes—in certain states, most notably Pennsylvania,
was not done “as the Legislature thereof may direct” as Article II required. This
was the same type of argument that had been raised with respect to Vermont’s
ballots in the 1796 presidential election. The specific claim was that the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court had allowed, as a covid-19 accommodation, for
mail-in ballots to be counted if they were postmarked by Election Day,
November 3, 2020, and received by November 6, despite the Pennsylvania
legislature’s designation of 8pm on November 3 as the deadline for valid ballots.
Similar allegations were raised regarding non-legislative covid-19-related
accommodations for mail-in ballots in other states that Biden had carried
including Wisconsin. 28 Unlike the 1796 and 1800 elections, however, there
seemed no plausible basis for claiming that disqualification of the challenged
popular mail-in ballots would have been large enough to have changed the
electoral-vote results in any of the relevant states, including Pennsylvania. Of
course, in 1796 and 1800, the presidential electors were to deliberate and assign
their votes, not follow popular vote results. Nor, unlike the 2000 election to be
discussed in Part II, would reversing the electoral-vote outcome in one state
have suffice the outcome of the 2020 presidential election. Finally, by contrast
to the 1876 election, there were no instances of states proposing two contested
slates of electors, despite efforts by Trump supporters to encourage presidential
electors in states that Biden had won to defect.
Nevertheless, these and other public pronouncements of election fraud by
Trump, Cruz, Hawley, and other Republican Members of Congress, supplied
legitimation and apparent legal, constitutional justification for millions of
Americans who supported Trump, including the thousands who stormed the
Capitol to stop the January 6, 2021 certification. Because of that attack, some
of the Republican members of Congress who had earlier expressed support not
to object to certification once order was restored and certification was continued
later that night.
Ultimately, only 8 Republican Senators and 139
Representatives voted in favor of one or both objections to certification: 1) the
request for a commission was made as an objection to certification of Arizona’s
electoral votes (the first close state in alphabetical order that Biden won), and 2)
the Article II challenge was made as an objection to certification of
Pennsylvania’s electoral votes. And Vice President Michael Pence, as President
of the Senate, certified the electoral votes and declared President-Elect Biden
the winner of the 2020 Presidential election.
A federal district court had granted a request by the Wisconsin Democratic Party for a
six-day extension to state law requiring absentee ballots to be returned by election night,
which the Seventh Circuit reversed. The Supreme Court, in a 5-3 vote, affirmed the
appellate court in denying the extension. 20a66_new_m6io.pdf (supremecourt.gov)
28
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This chapter has recounted the U.S. history of peaceful presidential
transition of power, disputes about presidential electoral votes, and how such
disputes were resolved in the past. It is useful to understand these antecedents
to understand the legal claims which, regardless of how well they were
understood by the supporters of Donald Trump who assaulted the U.S. Capitol
on January 6, 2021, ultimately justified that unprecedented event. How the
United States and its people will fare in the years to follow, whether they will
learn and grow or whether January 6 is a harbinger of the decline of U.S.
democracy, remains to be seen.
Thomas H. Lee
Leitner Family Professor of Law
Fordham Law School
thlee@fordham.edu
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